UNCLASSIFIED // NOTIONAL DATA

Certification

As of Oct 27, 2026

Certification

PCA certification workspace · FY2028 · Owner: Office of the Principal Cyber Advisor (OSD)

In progress

Statutory data call

10 USC 392a requires the Principal Cyber Advisor to review each proposed cyber budget and certify to the Secretary, by January 31 of the year before the fiscal year, whether each is adequate; requires the Secretary to report every uncertified budget to Congress by March 31; and tasks the Deputy Principal Cyber Advisor with identifying shortfalls in capabilities for missions in and through cyberspace.

This workspace assembles the data call the statute requires. Adequacy reflects the dispositions analysts record here.

Days until January 31 certification

Due January 31, 2027

Days until March 31 Congress report

155

Due March 31, 2027

Service certifications

Each service PCA certifies its own service cyber budget before it reaches the department comptroller. The OSD PCA certification rolls up these service certifications.


Army	21	$893.2M	9	Not yet reviewed
Navy Department	36	$938.5M	14	Adequate with concerns
Air Force	26	$694.5M	9	Not yet reviewed

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Adequacy by organization

Adequacy dispositions recorded by analysts. Nothing is judged automatically.


Cyber National Mission Force	$730.5M	24	50%	7	6	4	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
DoW Cyber Defense Command	$525.5M	25	28%	5	1	2	Adequate with concerns	Detection coverage is strong but several fielded tools have no operator feedback in twelve months.
Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber (Army)	$730.9M	17	59%	6	5	2	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber (Navy)	$422.9M	17	59%	8	4	3	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber (Marines)	$472.8M	14	21%	4	1	0	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber (Air Force)	$684.0M	25	44%	8	5	5	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
Coast Guard Cyber	$51.6M	5	40%	0	0	2	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
CYBERCOM Cyber Acquisition and Technology Directorate (J9)	$242.2M	16	56%	7	3	1	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
Joint Cyber Warfighting Architecture Program Executive Office	$339.1M	7	43%	1	1	4	Adequate	Programs of record are funded through FY28 with fielded coverage across C2 and training.
Army Principal Cyber Advisor	$162.4M	4	0%	3	0	1	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
Navy Principal Cyber Advisor	$42.8M	5	20%	2	0	1	Adequate with concerns	Service lane shows duplicated hunt tooling with CPT kits funded elsewhere.
Air Force Principal Cyber Advisor	$10.5M	1	0%	1	0	0	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
Indo-Pacific Command cyber planning cell	$217.9M	7	43%	1	3	0	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
European Command cyber planning cell	$83.6M	8	38%	4	2	2	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
Special Operations Command cyber cell	$347.0M	7	57%	0	2	2	Inadequate	Notional analysis: stuck pilots and no transition path for access tooling leaves a gap.
Africa Command cyber planning cell	$63.7M	1	100%	1	1	1	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
Central Command cyber planning cell	$116.6M	4	50%	0	0	0	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
Northern Command cyber planning cell	$44.8M	3	33%	2	1	2	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
Southern Command cyber planning cell	$69.3M	3	33%	2	0	1	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
Space Command cyber planning cell	$47.6M	2	50%	1	0	1	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
Strategic Command cyber planning cell	$34.5M	2	0%	1	0	0	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
Transportation Command cyber planning cell	$18.1M	2	100%	1	1	1	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
Defense Information Systems Agency	$38.8M	3	33%	0	0	2	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
National Security Agency (support only)	$49.0M	3	0%	2	0	0	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded

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Current FY spend by owning organization

Capability shortfall list

The Deputy PCA identifies capability shortfalls for the Program Budget Review.

Low fielded coverage for space ground segment defense

Accepted

Defensive Cyberspace Operations · 3 linked capabilities

Basis: Few fielded DCO capabilities target space ground segment environments in the registry.
Recommended action: Prioritize transition of space ground segment pilots

Access tooling stuck in pilot

Accepted

Offensive Cyberspace Operations · 3 linked capabilities

Basis: Several OCO pilots ended without transition despite operator ratings of 4 or higher.
Recommended action: Identify a receiving program office through CIWC

Duplicated hunt kits across services

Accepted

Defensive Cyberspace Operations · 3 linked capabilities

Basis: Hunt capabilities are duplicated across at least three owning orgs with combined spend.
Recommended action: Refer for consolidation review

Training range fragmentation

Open

Training and Rehearsal · 3 linked capabilities

Basis: Multiple training environments overlap with PCTE functionality.
Recommended action: Align range investments to PCTE

No feedback on fielded DODIN tools

Open

DODIN Operations · 3 linked capabilities

Basis: Fielded DODIN capabilities carry no operator feedback in twelve months.
Recommended action: Task DCDC to collect operator ratings

Industrial control detection gap

Open

Defensive Cyberspace Operations · 3 linked capabilities

Basis: Detection coverage for industrial control environments is thin.
Recommended action: Program a detection capability for industrial control

C2 deconfliction duplication

Open

Command and Control · 3 linked capabilities

Basis: Two or more deconfliction services operate in parallel.
Recommended action: Consolidate onto JCC2

ISR enabling tools unrecorded

Open

Cyber ISR Enabling · 3 linked capabilities

Basis: ISR enabling capabilities are known to operators but recorded in no system.
Recommended action: Designate a system of record

Mobile environment access gap

Open

Offensive Cyberspace Operations · 3 linked capabilities

Basis: Few capabilities target mobile environments.
Recommended action: Assess requirement with CNMF

Tactical edge sustainment risk

Open

DODIN Operations · 3 linked capabilities

Basis: Tactical edge tools rely on a single expiring contract vehicle.
Recommended action: Establish a follow on vehicle

Weapon system cyber assessment capacity

Open

Defensive Cyberspace Operations · 3 linked capabilities

Basis: Weapon system assessment capability is concentrated in one org.
Recommended action: Expand assessment capacity across services

Cloud C2 integration gap

Open

Command and Control · 3 linked capabilities

Basis: Cloud hosted C2 tools are not integrated with Unified Platform.
Recommended action: Integrate through JDE

Certification package

Assembled portfolio totals, service certifications, organization adequacy, and shortfalls form the package for human determination.

Capabilities

220

Current FY spend

$5.92B

Accepted shortfalls

Cycle owner: Office of the Principal Cyber Advisor (OSD). Cycle status: In progress.

1 of 24 owning organizations recorded as adequate. 1 of 3 service lane dispositions reviewed. Full adequacy and service lane details appear above and in the generated summary.

Certification decision: Not yet recorded

March 31 report

Every organization budget not yet recorded as adequate is listed for the report.


Cyber National Mission Force	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
DoW Cyber Defense Command	Adequate with concerns	Detection coverage is strong but several fielded tools have no operator feedback in twelve months.
Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber (Army)	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber (Navy)	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber (Marines)	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber (Air Force)	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
Coast Guard Cyber	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
CYBERCOM Cyber Acquisition and Technology Directorate (J9)	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
Army Principal Cyber Advisor	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
Navy Principal Cyber Advisor	Adequate with concerns	Service lane shows duplicated hunt tooling with CPT kits funded elsewhere.
Air Force Principal Cyber Advisor	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
Indo-Pacific Command cyber planning cell	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
European Command cyber planning cell	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
Special Operations Command cyber cell	Inadequate	Notional analysis: stuck pilots and no transition path for access tooling leaves a gap.
Africa Command cyber planning cell	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
Central Command cyber planning cell	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
Northern Command cyber planning cell	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
Southern Command cyber planning cell	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
Space Command cyber planning cell	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
Strategic Command cyber planning cell	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
Transportation Command cyber planning cell	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
Defense Information Systems Agency	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded
National Security Agency (support only)	Not yet reviewed	No basis recorded

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